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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA H. JENSEN, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 
JAMES T. JENSEN, 
Respondent/ Appellee. 
No. 990465-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Linda H. Jensen ("Wife") appeals a final Supplemental Decree of Divorce entered by 
the district court on January 19, 1999. This court's jurisdiction is based upon Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Husband, a lawyer, transferred certain Zions Bank stock he received as a gift 
to himself and Wife as joint tenants in 1986. Did the trial court err in nevertheless holding 
the stock to be husband's separate property, based upon Husband's alleged subjective intent 
that he did not really mean to make Wife an equal owner of the stock? This issue presents 
a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P .2d 1065 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). This issue was preserved at R. 120-21. 
2. Did the trial court err in awarding all of the parties' interest in significant 
ranching operations to Husband, even though the parties both enhanced the value of those 
operations through marital funds and their joint efforts during the maiTiage? This issue is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991 ). This issue was preserved at R. 111-19. 
GOVERNING LAW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative or of central importance. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
The parties were married July 30, 1970. Wife filed a complaint for divorce on Feb-
ruary 16, 1996. (R. 1-4.) The trial was held October 28-30, 1997, and November 12, 1997. 
Over a year later, the court issued its Memorandum Decision, Supplemental Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions ofLaw, and Supplemental Decree ofDivorce on January 19, 1999, in which 
the court determined that, after a twenty-seven year marriage, the bulk of the parties' estate 
consisted ofHusband's separate property. (R. 196-246.) Husband timely filed Objections 
to Supplemental Findings of Fact, Supplemental Decree of Divorce, Motion to Amend and 
Request for Oral Argument pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52 on January 29, 1999. 
(R. 247-52.) This motion was denied by order entered April14, 1999. (R. 296-99.) The 
notice of appeal was filed May 13, 1999. (R. 300-02.) 
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B. Statement of Facts. 
James T. Jensen ("Husband") and Linda H. Jensen ("Wife") were married in 1970 in 
Utah and had three children during the marriage, two of whom had reached the age of major-
ity at the time of trial, and the other of whom was still in high school. (R. 1-2, R. 323 at 
pp. 5, 12-13.) 
Wife was fifty-one years old at the time of trial. She attended college for three years 
before the marriage but upon Husband's request did not work outside the home during most 
of the parties' marriage. (R. 323 at pp. 6, 29, 120.) Husband explained that he did not want 
Wife to work during the marriage so they could spend more time together. (R. 324 at p. 195.) 
In accord with his wishes, instead of working outside the home, Wife focused on maintaining 
the parties' domestic affairs and caring for their children. (R. 109; R. 323 at pp. 44-45.) The 
only exception to this is that she worked part-time from 1985 to 1990 at Husband's law 
office performing clerical work. (R. 323 at pp. 43, 89; R. 324 at pp. 196-97.) 
Husband was fifty seven years old at the time of trial. He was admitted to the Utah 
State Bar in 1969. (R. 323 at p. 136.) He practiced law with his father, Therald Jensen, in 
Price, Utah, unti11990, when he became in-house counsel for Savage Industries. (R. 323 at 
pp. 7, 45.) He is currently Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Savage 
Industries. (R. 221.) Husband was a new attorney when the parties were married, and Wife's 
father gave Husband "quite a bit ofbusiness" in the early 1980's by introducing Husband to 
contacts in the mining industry. (R. 323 at pp. 26, 117.) 
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Over the course of the twenty-seven-year marriage, the parties acquired substantial 
assets and maintained a high standard ofliving. (R. 109; R. 323 at pp. 55-57.) They received 
property and other assets, through gift or inheritance, from each of their parents. (R. 109.) 
Wife's father gave the parties the land on which their first home was built, 1 and Husband's 
father was the source of some of the ranch properties and part of the bank stock that is at 
issue on appeal. (R. 323 at pp. 37-38). These assets were commingled between the parties. 
Wife is contesting the court's award of two assets: 58,352 shares of Zions Bank stock, and 
the ranching operations (consisting ofT-N Company, T-N Ranches, and the Moynier Ranch). 
The court awarded the Zions Bank stock and the ranching operations to Husband as separate 
property. Wife contends that all of the Zions Bank stock and the parties' interest in the 
ranching operations was marital property and should have been equally divided. 
1. Zions Bank Stock. 
The parties owned 88,493 shares of Zions Bank stock as joint tt~nants at the time of 
trial? (Defendant's Exhibit 20.) The initial shares of stock were obtained in 1973, when 
Zions Bank purchased Carbon/Emery Bank in a stock exchange, and Husband's premarital 
shares of Carbon/Emery Bank were converted to 2,616 shares of Zions stock. After taking 
1 The home was in Spring Glen, Utah, and the parties jointly held title to the land and 
home. The parties divided the proceeds from the sale of the home equally. (R. 323 at pp. 37-
38). 
2 Husband requested in October 1997 that Zions Bank verify the number of shares held 
by the parties. Zions Bank confirmed that as of October 9, 1997, there were 86, 172 shares 
held by the parties as joint tenants, and that the parties had recently received an additional 
2,321 shares through a dividend reinvestment program that was held in book entry form. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 20). 
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into account subsequent sales, those shares eventually grew, through stock splits and divi-
dend reinvestment, to 58,352 shares at the time of trial. Husband conceded that the 
remaining 30,141 shares of Zions Bank stock were marital property; Husband's mother gifted 
approximately 10,066 shares to the parties during their marriage, and the parties purchased 
additional shares, and these shares had grown to 30,141 shares at the time of the divorce. 
(R. 325 at p. 87.) He contended, and the trial court held, that the remaining 58,352 shares 
were Husband's separate property. (R. 207-08). 
In 1985, Wife asked Husband if he would agree to put both oftheir names on all 
shares of stock as joint tenants "and he didn't have a problem with that. It was done. Before 
I even really realized it. And I felt at that point it wasn't an issue with him, or he wouldn't 
have done it .... " (R. 157; R. 323 at p. 64.) She testified that she asked to convert all shares 
to joint tenancy for two reasons: because she wanted some financial security if he died, and 
because she felt they "were working for everything together" in their marriage. (R. 323 at 
pp. 127-28.) 
On the other hand, Husband claimed he only put Wife's name on the stock certificates 
as a joint tenant because he "got tired" of discussing the matter with her. (R. 324 at p. 215.) 
He contended that he did not intend to give Wife a present interest in the stock, but only in-
tended to avoid probate. He conceded at trial that the stock certificates gave her a present 
interest in the stock, but contended he did not really intend that they would divide the shares 
equally if they divorced. (R. 324 at p. 216.) He never informed her of his secret intent not 
to transfer a present interest, nor did he suggest that she consult with a lawyer when he put 
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her name on the stock certificates. (R. 325 at pp. 85-87.) Husband admitted that he could 
have legally put the stock in a trust that would have given all shares to Wife in the event of 
death but no shares in the event of divorce. (R. 325 at p. 86.) He further admitted that his 
father had an active probate law practice at the time and would have known how to achieve 
this. (R. 324 at p. 192.) Finally, the parties treated the stock as a marital asset during the 
marriage; they jointly paid taxes on dividends that were reinvested (Defendant's Exhibit 4; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5), and received dividends periodically from the stock and used them to 
pay family expenses. (R. 323 at p. 65.) 
The value of the 88,493 shares was $2,491,090, and Wife proposed that she be 
awarded half of the shares, or 44,247 shares. (R. 42, 109.) Instead, the court awarded her 
one-half ofthe 30,141 shares that Husband conceded were marital propetty, or 15,071 shares. 
(R. 207-08.) As for the remaining shares acquired during the marriage, the court stated that 
there was "no evidence adduced at the trial of any donative intent" in the 1985 transfer, and 
thus awarded those shares to Husband as his separate property. (R. 231.) 
2. The Ranching Operations. 
The ranching operations consist of three distinct but inextricably related assets. T-N 
Ranches and Moynier are essentially land-holding entities. T-N Ranches is a partnership 
owned by Husband and his three siblings; it owns some 35,000 acres of land in Carbon 
County, Utah, along with associated water rights and grazing permits. (R. 119; R. 323 at p. 
164; Defendant's Exhibit 39; Plaintiff's Exhibit 11.) The Moynier property consists of 
21,400 acres of land in Carbon, Duchesne and Utah Counties, together with state and federal 
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grazing permits covering some 100,000 acres of land, title to which is in the name of 
Husband and his two brothers. (R. 323 at pp. 157-62; R. 324 at pp. 180-81; Defendant's 
Exhibits 28 and 30.) T-N Company a partnership also owned by Husband and his two 
brothers, and it is the operating entity for the ranching property, owning cattle, equipment, 
and machinery associated with the ranch. (R. 323 at pp. 148-49.) T-N Company leases the 
entire 35,000 acres T-N Ranches landholding from T-N Ranches and the Moynier property 
for a nominal sum of$1,000 per year. (R. 323 at p. 168.) 
In support ofhis claim that Wife was not entitled to any portion of T-N Company or 
T-N Ranches, Husband offered evidence that Wife has never owned an equity interest in 
them in her own name and alleged that she only rarely worked on the ranches. (R. 326 at 
p. 31.) Initially, Judge Young discounted these facts, acknowledging that "there is an overall 
family environment that is being conducted and created and she's rendering contributions to 
that, allowing him to render contributions to the other .... " (R. 326 at p. 32.) The court also 
noted that the fact Husband worked for free for the ranching operations over a period of 
several years weighed in Wife's favor, since his contributions to the ranching operations took 
time away from their marriage but benefited the ranching operations. (R. 326 at pp. 35-36.) 
Nonetheless, the court ultimately did not award her any interest in the ranch property. 
(R. 227.) 
( 
The trial court determined that T-N Company and T-N Ranches were "inherited 
property" and awarded the entire interest in T-N Company and T-N Ranches to Husband. 
(R. 227.) The court based its determination on testimony that Therald Jensen had acquired 
-7-
the land throughout his lifetime, then gifted it over time to his children in order to fulfill a 
dream of giving away his estate to his children before he died. (R. 222.) The court 
additionally expressed concern that if he awarded Wife half of Husband's share in T-N 
Ranches or T-N Company, it would create too small of a minority interest in a closely-held 
corporation. (R. 326 at pp. 15-16.) 
Regarding the Moynier property, the trial court apparently believ1~d that it was Wife's 
burden to prove that the property was paid for with marital funds, in the absence of evidence 
that separate funds were used to acquire it. (R. 223-24.) Even though the court found that 
part of the down-payment came from marital funds and that the installment payments came 
from income earned in the ranching operation during the marriage, the court concluded that 
it was "equitable" that the entire property be considered Husband's separate property. (R. 
223-24.) 
Although the ranching properties constitute a single enterprise, the ownership and 
background of each entity is somewhat unique, and so they are discussed separately below. 
Husband and his two brothers are presently involved in a partition lawsuit regarding all of 
the ranching properties. (Defendant's Exhibit 44.) 
A. T-N Company. 
T-N Company was formed in 1969 by Husband's father, Therald Jensen, and his three 
sons James, Butch and Jerry. (R. 78.) It initially owned construction equipment and cattle. 
(R. 323 at pp. 7, 35.) T-N Company still operates as a cattle business, but in 1997 much of 
the construction equipment was sold for $900,000. (R. 323 at p. 149.) Out of the remaining 
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assets of T-N Company, the remaining equipment is worth approximately $600,000, and the 
remaining cattle and other livestock are worth approximately $1.1 million. (R. 323 at 
pp. 150-53.) T-N Company also owns several trucks and trailers and a shop building. 
(R. 325 at 18; Defendant's Exhibit 12.) 
Throughout the course of the parties' marriage, Husband has maintained the books 
of T-N Company and T-N Ranches, made most major decisions with regard to the company, 
and worked most weekends on matters related to T-N Company and/or T-N Ranches. 
(R. 323 at p. 35; R. 324 at pp. 193-94; R. 325.) Wife testified that Husband "worked five 
days a week in the office, and ... most of the weekend was spen[t] working at the ranch." 
(R. 323 at p. 35). He often participated in construction projects on the land, operating the 
heavy machinery and doing "whatever needed to be done." (R. 323 at p. 36). 
The parties' testimony as to the amount of time Wife spent specifically on the 
ranching operations differed; Wife testified that she "often" accompanied Husband to the 
ranch properties on weekends and performed cooking and maintenance duties, and Husband 
claimed she only worked on the ranches ten times at most toward the end of the marriage. 
(R. 81; R. 323 at pp. 119-20.) Nonetheless, it is undisputed that while Husband was working 
on the ranching operations, Wife was tending to the family's needs.3 (R. 109.) 
3 Husband argued that Wife is not entitled to any portion of the ranching operations 
because she did not "support" him in his ranching efforts. (R. 81.) While it is true she was 
opposed to the fact that he spent so much time on the ranches that he spent little with her and 
their children, she was "supporting" the family while he was away at the ranches by raising 
the children, paying bills, etc. 
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According to the tax returns and equity accounts for T-N Company, Husband owns 
49.29% of the company, and his two brothers own the remainder in e:qual shares. (R. 79; 
R. 324 at pp. 22-24, 80.) However, Husband claims the brothers made an oral "agreement" 
at some point that they each really own one-third of the company. (R. 324 at p. 108.) His 
two brothers receive yearly salaries from T-N Company, yet Husband has never drawn a 
salary from T-N Company, even though he spent as much time on the ranching operations 
as they did throughout the parties' marriage. (R. 323 at pp. 126, 148; R. 324 at pp. 199-202.) 
He also performed free legal work for T-N Company. (R. 324 at p. 202.) 
Over the years, T-N Company required major cash subsidy in order to continue 
operating. In the early years, that subsidy came from Husband's father, who loaned a signifi-
cant amount to T-N Company in exchange for promissory notes from tht! company. (R. 325 
at pp. 87-88). Husband's father later gifted his interest in the promissory notes separately to 
Husband and Wife in $10,000 annual increments each as part of his estate planning. (R. 325 
at pp. 87-88). By 1993, T-N Company owed Husband $126,931 and Wife $30,000. (R. 324 
at p. 51). It owed Husband's law office $78,348. (R. 324 at p. 51.) It also owed $85,031 to 
Malpaso, a trucking company which was formed during the marriage and which was for that 
reason clearly a marital asset even though the stock was in Husband's name. (R. 323 at 
pp. 34-35, 174-75.) The funds Malpaso and Wife lent to T-N Company were used to pur-
chase heavy machinery for T-N Company, which machinery was then used as collateral by 
the company to secure financing for additional growth and development. (R. 118.) In 
addition, Malpaso, a marital asset, was completely absorbed into T-N Company. 
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In 1993, the debts described above were converted into equity in T-N Company. 
(R. 324 at pp. 51-53; R. 325 at pp. 87-88.) This equity was shown as part of Husband's 
capital in the company although it is undisputed that a portion of that equity came from 
marital property (Malpaso) and a portion came from Wife's separate interest in the 
promissory notes. 
The trial court failed to account for the $30,000 owed to Wife directly or for any 
portion of the $85,031 owed to Malpaso. Furthermore, in early 1996, the parties sold 
$65,000 ofthe Zions Bank stock they held as joint tenants and transferred the proceeds into 
T-N Company. (R. 323 at pp. 66, 81-82; R. 325 at p. 48; Plaintiffs Exhibit 7.) Again, the 
trial court failed to account for Wife's portion of this contribution into T-N Company. 
The parties presented different values for T-N Company at trial. According to Wife's 
expert Deane Smith, T-N Company is worth $2.2 million, and Husband's 49.29% share is 
worth $1,066,000. (R. 323 at p. 132; R. 324 at p. 23.) Husband's expert Derk Rasmussen 
valued T-N Company at $1.4 million. (R. 324 at pp. 140- 41.) The trial court did not resolve 
the valuation issue. 
B. T-N Ranches. 
T-N Ranches is a corporate entity formed in 1983. It owns the title to the ranch 
property and grazing permits T-N Company uses at a token rental. (R. 323 at pp. 7, 166, 
168.) Husband has acted as T-N Ranches' principal attorney since 1992, after his father's 
death. (R. 325 at p. 82.) In 1988, Husband and Wife jointly gifted an 8.38% ownership 
interest in T-N Ranches to Husband's two brothers and his sister. (R. 324 at pp. 24, 50; 
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R. 325 at p. 85; Plaintiffs Exhibit 12.) This left each of the four siblings owning 3.53% of 
T-N Ranches. T-N Company held the remainder. Upon Therald Jensen's death in 1992, the 
shares were reallocated, leaving each sibling with 25% of T-N Ranches. (R. 222; R. 324 at 
p. 50.) Although the 1988 gift to Husband's siblings was made by Husb~md and Wife as joint 
owners, Husband contended at trial that the interest was his sole and Sl:!parate property. 
T-N Company leases over 35,000 acres of land, plus grazing permits, from T-N 
Ranches and the Moynier property at the reduced rate of $1,000 per year for the entire 
property, which works out to 1.8 cents per acre for the owned property and nothing for the 
leases and permits. (R. 323 at p. 168.) Wife's expert valued the parties' 25% interest in T-N 
Ranches at $1,312,500. (R. 323 at pp. 11, 164; R. 324 at pp. 32-33.) Husband's expert 
valued the parties' interest in T-N Ranches at $127,208, prior to application of an alleged 
minority interest discount. (R. 324 at pp. 131-32, 152-56.) The trial court did not resolve 
the valuation issue. 
C. The Moynier Ranch. 
The Moynier Ranch consists of 21,400 deeded acres of ram;h land in Carbon, 
Duchesne and Utah Counties, as well as over 100,000 acres of federal anci state grazing 
permits. (R. 323 at pp. 157-62; R. 324 at pp. 180-81; Defendant's Exhibit 30) It was 
acquired in 1976, well into the marriage, for approximately $827,000. The $25,000 down 
payment came from the parties' marital funds. (R. 82; R. 224.) The court found that the 
installment payments, were "paid for through the ranching operations or T.N. Company." 
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(R. 223.) Husband admitted that $148,000 of the purchase price did not come from sales or 
exchanges of separate property. (R. 323 at p. 182.) 
Husband would not express an opinion on the value of the Moynier Ranch, but his 
expert valued the parties' one-third interest at $333,679. (R. 323 at p. 173; R. 324 at p. 126.) 
The expert's opinion was based on an estimate from a real estate appraiser, Sam Sanders, 
whose wife works for Husband at Savage Industries. (R. 325 at p. 96.) However, the Utah 
County Assessor valued the Utah County portion of the Moynier property alone at 
$3,370,000, and Husband did not protest this valuation. (R. 324 at p. 181; R. 325 at p. 84.) 
Wife's expert valued the Moynier Ranch at $5,375,000, and the parties' one-third interest at 
$1,791,667. (R. 324 at p. 35.) The trial court did not resolve the valuation dispute. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, separate property becomes part of the marital estate when it has been 
gifted to the other spouse; or when it has been consumed or commingled with marital proper-
ty to the extent that its separate character can no longer be identified; or when the other 
spouse has contributed to its enhancement, maintenance, or protection. 
Husband placed his interest in the Zions Bank stock in joint tenancy in 1985. The law 
presumes a transfer of a present interest, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that 
both parties intended the transaction to have some other effect. In this case, the court based 
its decision on Husband's testimony that he did not intend to transfer a present interest to his 
wife. Wife, however, was not informed of Husband's secret intent. In the light of the 
fiduciary duty owed by spouses to each other, and given the undisputed evidence that Wife 
-13-
did not share Husband's secret intent, the legal standard for avoiding the transfer into joint 
tenancy was not met. 
The ranch properties became marital property because of commingling and augmenta-
tion during the marriage. Moynier, which was valued between $333,679 and $1,791,667, 
was purchased after the marriage with funds earned by the parties and, in part, by the ranch-
ing operation. It subsidized the ranch operation by leasing its landholdings and grazing per-
mits to the ranch operation for a nominal sum for many years. In addition, the ranch 
converted a $30,000 promissory note owed to Wife and a $85,031 note owed to a marital 
entity into "equity." At least $78,000 of Husband's earnings from practicing law during the 
marriage were also invested in the ranch operation, as were the proceeds of sale of 1,837 
shares of jointly owned Zions Bank stock. Finally, Husband devoted extraordinary hours 
without compensation to the ranch operation. That investment of time could not have 
occurred without Wife's contribution in maintaining the affairs of the family. The trial court 
erred in failing to account for Wife's substantial financial investmc~nt in the ranching 
operation, and in failing to find that the ranch operation had become marital property. 
ARGUMENT 
"Marital property is ordinarily all property acquired during marriage and it encom-
passes all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Marital property includes accounts receivable, tangible assets, and good will of a professional 
practice, all products of labor of one spouse. See id. "[A]ccumulations resulting from a 
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combination of the use of separate property of a spouse with the labor, skill and industry of 
one or both of the members of the community should be equitably divided between the two." 
Portillo v. Shappie, 636 P.2d 878, 879 (N.M. 1981); see also Barkley v. Barkley, 119 Ohio 
App. 3d 155, 694 N.E.2d 989, 995 (1997) (marital property specifically includes "all income 
and appreciation on separate property due to the labor, monetary, or in-kind contribution of 
either of the spouses that occurred during the marriage"). The use of marital funds and 
efforts to maintain and augment an asset support a finding that the appreciation of separate 
property is marital in character. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
explained that property acquired by one spouse either by gift or inheritance becomes a part 
of the marital estate if"(l) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed 
to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equit-
able interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost through com-
mingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein 
to the other spouse." 760 P.2d at 308. There is a presumption that property acquired during 
the marriage is marital property. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P .2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). Although Utah case law is not entirely clear or consistent on the point, the character-
ization of property as marital or separate should be based upon the factors set forth in 
Mortensen, not upon general equitable considerations, and equity should be invoked only in 
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extraordinary circumstances. See id.; see generally Dolowitz, The Conundrum ofGifted, 
Inherited and Premarital Property in Divorce, 11 (Apr.) Utah B.J. 16 (1998). 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO A WARD WIFE ONE-
HALF OF THE ZIONS BANK STOCK. 
When the sole owner of property creates a joint tenancy in that property, a valid and 
enforceable interest is created in the new joint owner. In 1985, Husband transferred 
separately owned shares of stock in Zions Bank to himself and Wife as joint tenants. As a 
result, each party received a one-half ownership interest in the stock with full rights of 
survivorship.4 McCoullough v. Wasserback, 30 Utah 2d 398, 518 P.2d 691, 693 (1974). 
Husband now claims that his intention in creating joint ownership ofthe stock was not to 
transfer a present interest to Wife, but to avoid probate. 
In Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P.2d 327 (1941), the Utah Supreme Court 
adopted the rule that a transfer of property into joint tenancy creates a pn:sumption of present 
joint ownership that can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 
In that case, the defendant's former wife sued him for past due child support. The defendant 
had since remarried. His new wife had received $1,000 from her deceased husband's estate, 
and she and her new husband had deposited the funds in a joint bank account. Both of them 
testified that their intent was to avoid probate and that they had no intention of creating a 
present interest in the husband which would be reachable by his creditors, including his 
4 Had Husband predeceased this action, Wife would have undeniably received sole 
title to the stock and to other assets described herein which were owned jointly by Wife and 
Husband. 
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former wife. The Supreme Court upheld a judgment in favor of the former wife against the 
funds, holding that the parties' statements of their intention were insufficient to satisfy the 
requirement of clear and convincing proof: 
The only evidence refuting the implied joint savings account in the instant case 
was that of the testimony of the codepositors to the effect that their purpose in 
establishing the joint savings account was to take advantage of the survivorship 
provision, and that the money was intended to be the sole and separate property of the 
intervener. Such proof under the circumstances of this case cannot be termed so clear 
and convincing as to require the trial court to find in favor of appellant. To say that 
it was sufficient would throw open the door to fraud and collusion as between 
codepositors and third parties. This equity will not do. 
120 P.2d at 331. Accord, Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571,212 P.2d 194, 199 (1949) (in 
a divorce case, court held that to overcome the presumption, clear and convincing proof must 
be presented that both parties intended that no present interest be created). 
More recent cases continue this view. In Estate of Ashton v. Ashton, 898 P.2d 824, 
826 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the court explained that when title to property is held in joint 
tenancy, "a rebuttable presumption arises that the title holders intended to create a valid joint 
tenancy." This presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of 
either fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity. Continental Bank and Trust, Co. v. 
Kimball, 21 Utah 2d 152, 442 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1968). Absent such evidence, the parties 
are bound by the joint tenancy and "cannot show that a result was intended contrary to that 
which the law of joint tenancy relationship imposes." !d.; see also McCullough, 518 P.2d 
at 694 (upholding ownership right of surviving joint tenant despite evidence that joint 
ownership was not intended to create rights in survivor, but was "solely for convenience"). 
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In this case, Husband's evidence utterly fails to establish that both parties intended the 
transfer to be effective only in the event of Husband's death. Husband.,s only evidence that 
no present interest was intended was his own self-serving statement made years after the fact 
that he intended to avoid probate but did not intend a present transfi!r. He presented no 
contemporaneous evidence to corroborate his claim. He testified that his secret intent was 
not communicated to or shared by Wife, and she testified that her understanding was that it 
was done because they were both working together in the marriage, with joint tenancy chosen 
because of the additional advantages of the survivorship rule. That evidence does not satisfy 
the mutual intent requirement of Greener that evidence of intent contrary to the joint owner-
ship presumption must be clear and convincing evidence of mutual intent. 
It also is generally accepted in other jurisdictions that a unilateral intent not to convey 
a present interest does not overcome the presumption. 
The well established rule in Arizona is that a presumed gift occurs when one spouse 
places his separate real property in joint tenancy with the other spouse and that this 
presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidt~nce to the contrary. 
This presumed gift cannot be overcome simply by husband's aft~~r-the-fact testimony 
that the property was placed in joint tenancy only as a means of avoiding probate and 
not as an intended gift. 
Valladee v. Valladee, 149 Ariz. 304, 718 P.2d 206, 209 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1986). 
[T]he presumption created by the [joint tenancy] deed cannot be overcome by 
testimony of the hidden intentions of one of the parties, but only by evidence tending 
to prove a common understanding or an agreement that the character of the property 
was to be other than joint tenancy. Since there was no evidence of a common under-
standing or an agreement the presumption was not overcome. 
Machado v. Machado, 58 Cal.2d 501, 25 Cal. Rptr. 87, 375 P.2d 55, 58 (1962). Accord, 
Sloane v. Sloane, 132 Ariz. 414, 646 P.2d 299, 300 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1982) ("Can the hid-
-18-
den intention of one of the parties negate the presumption? We think not."); Hart v. Hart, 
3 77 So.2d 51, 53 (Fla. App. 1979). 
Moreover, in this case Husband transferred the shares while keeping his secret 
intention hidden from his own wife. In dealing with her, Husband owed a fiduciary duty of 
good faith. Madsonia Realty Co. v. Zion's Bank and Trust Co. (In re Madsen's Estate), 123 
Utah 2d 327, 259 P.2d 595 (1953) ("[A] husband owes to his wife a high degree of good 
faith, and ... husband and wife occupy a relation of special trust and confidence, and when 
such relationship is abused, equity will intervene to right the wrong"); Glover v. Glover, 121 
Utah 2d 362,242 P.2d 298, 300 (1952) ("There is no rule oflaw more firmly established than 
that which holds that transactions between persons occupying fiduciary or confidential 
relations with each other, in which the stronger or superior party obtains an advantage over 
the other, cannot be upheld"); Smith v. Smith, 860 P.2d 634, 643 (Idaho 1993); In re 
Marriage ofModnick, 33 CalJd 897, 191 Cal. Rptr. 629, 663 P.2d 187, 191 (1983). 
In this case, Husband's status as an attorney heightens the level of scrutiny appro-
priately applied to the transaction. In Marshall v. Marshall, 166 W.Va. 304, 273 S.E.2d 360 
(1980), for example, the husband, who was also a lawyer, pressured his emotionally unstable 
wife to convey jointly-owned stock to himself prior to a reconciliation which lasted only for 
a short period of time. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that "the 
general rule is that where persons occupy a fiduciary or confidential relationship the lack of 
independent advice on the part of the person who claims to be disadvantaged by the trans-
action may be a significant factor in court's evaluation of the overall bona fides of the trans-
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action. Here the problem is made more acute by the husband being an attorney." 273 S.E.2d 
at 362-63. 
Judge Young ignored the transfer into joint tenancy because he found that Husband 
lacked donative intent in placing the property in joint tenancy. Husband's subjective intent, 
however, is irrelevant. The transfer can only be ignored if both parties lacked the intent to 
create a present interest. 
Where, however, the parties have entered into and expressed in writing a 
complete agreement which is clear as to the intent and purpose of the deposit, the 
intent so expressed will be given effect unless the instrument is successfully attacked 
for fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity, or unless it is shown by "clear and 
convincing proof' that the parties intended the instrument to have a different effect 
from that expressed. 
Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194, 199 (1949). See also Neill v. Royce, 101 
Utah 181, 120 P.2d 327. In this case, there was no evidence or finding that Wife did not 
intend to create a present interest, and the record provides no basis for such a finding. 
Moreover, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to its analysis. When the correct 
legal standard is applied, the evidence fails as a matter of law to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that the Zion's Bank stock is not part of the marital estate. See Bushell 
v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1982) (including in marital estate fourteen acres ofland 
given to husband by his father); Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Utah 
1973) (including in marital estate money resulting from investment of gifts to wife from her 
relatives); Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P .2d 928, 929 (1968) (including in marital 
estate shares of stock given to husband by his father and sister). 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INCLUDE THE 
PARTIES' INTEREST IN THE RANCH PROPERTIES IN THE 
MARITAL ESTATE. 
A. All of the Ranch Properties Should Have Been Included in the 
Marital Estate Because They Were Commingled with Marital 
Assets and Enhanced by the Parties' Joint Efforts. 
Separate property becomes part of the marital estate when "the property has been 
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or [other] exchanges," and where the 
other spouse has through his or her efforts "contributed to its enhancement, maintenance, or 
protection." Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). Here, not only have 
commingled marital funds been used to maintain T-N Company, but Husband's ability to 
invest time and effort into T-N Company during the marriage came at the expense of time 
devoted to his family or his law practice, and was made possible by Wife's domestic contri-
butions in managing household affairs and caring for the parties' children. 
There was undisputed evidence that marital funds and property had been used to 
maintain and enhance the ranch properties. The $30,000 promissory note T-N Company 
owed to Wife was not paid, and was instead converted into equity in T-N Company. Wife's 
one-half interest in Malpaso (the trucking company), including but not limited to the $85,031 
promissory note that funded T-N Company equipment purchases, was also absorbed into T-N 
Company. In addition, over the course ofthe parties' marriage, Husband invested significant 
portions ofhis income from the practice oflaw, at least $78,000 into T-N Company. (R. 323 
at p. 126; R. 324 at p. 51.) The Moynier property, which was acquired with marital funds, 
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was leased to the ranching operation at nominal value, and thus was used to subsidize the 
ranching operation at the expense of income that could have been earned in the marketplace. 
Furthermore, 1,83 7 shares of stock in Zions Bank, owned jointly by both parties, were 
sold in 1996. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 7; Defendant's Exhibit 20; R. 323 at pp. 81-82.) The 
proceeds from this sale were used to purchase machinery for T-N Company and to finance 
its operations. 
In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1994), the court held that 
a portion of the husband's business property, which was initially paid for by funds the 
husband inherited, was properly included as a marital asset. The court explained that "[ e ]ven 
though the husband used inherited funds to pay the down payment on the building, he used 
substantial marital funds to maintain and augment that asset. We find no error in the deter-
mination that the appreciated portion of the asset changed its character from a personal asset 
to a marital asset." 875 P.2d at 602-03. 
In addition to the extensive commingling of funds, the ranch properties should have 
been included in the marital estate because Husband's ability to dedicate time. and effort in 
developing these entities was a direct result of Wife's domestic contributions to the family. 
In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990), the court held that it was error not to 
include in the marital estate the husband's professional corporation and royalty rights on 
surgical instruments developed during the marriage. The court emphasized that although the 
wife "was not his partner in the business of orthopedic surgery, she was his partner in the 
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'business' of marriage and her efforts were necessary contributions to the growth of his 
practice and the business." 802 P.2d at 1318. 
Like the wife in Dunn, Wife's efforts in maintaining the household and caring for the 
children enabled Husband to pursue with vigor his professional career and business enter-
prises, and he did so at the expense of his family. As described in Dunn, T-N Company 
should have been included in the marital estate because Wife and Husband were in the "busi-
ness of marriage" together. 
By failing to account for the undisputed commingling of marital property in T-N 
Company over a 27-year period, the trial court abused its discretion. The court's failure to 
credit Wife's contribution to Husband's ability to enhance those assets was also an abuse of 
discretion. The evidence plainly satisfied the Mortensen tests of commingling and joint 
contribution to the enhancement of the asset, and Husband's evidence failed to rebut the 
strong presumption that in such circumstances the property should be included in the marital 
estate. 
B. Additional Reasons Why Moynier Ranch Should Have Been 
Included in the Marital Estate. 
Property which was acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital property. 
The party seeking to exclude such property from the marital estate, and claiming it as his or 
her own separate property, has the burden of proof on that claim. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 
1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
With regard to the Moynier Ranch, the evidence established that the $25,000 down 
payment came from joint funds. Husband admitted that $147,000 of the purchase price did 
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not come rom separate property, and the court found that the installment payments were paid 
with income from the ranching operations earned during the marriage. Income earned on the 
ranching operations during the marriage is plainly marital property. Dunn v, Dunn, 802 P .2d 
1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Thus, the Moynierproperty, having been acquired with 
marital property, was itself marital property. 
CONCLUSION 
Wife requests that this court reverse the trial court's decision that the Zions Bank 
stock and ranch properties were separate property, and remand the case to the trial court with 
instructions to divide those properties in kind. See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1204-
05 (Utah 1983). 
~ 
DATED this~ day ofDecember, 1999. 
N:\18517\1\BRIEFRRP.WPD: 12/6/99 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 1 2 1998 
SALT~ COUNTY 
By ___ \._.JAJ~.-..--:::~~~ 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA H. JENSEN, ----------=-----------~~ "2. 7 S" 71 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





Case No. 964900752 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial October 28-31, 
1997, with final oral arguments being scheduled for November 12, 
1997. Thereafter the Court met with counsel to further discuss the 
case informally and see if a stipulated resolution could occur. 
The discussions were helpful but did not result in a settlement. 
During trial the plaintiff was present and represented by her 
attorney Harold G. Christensen. The defendant was present and 
represented by his attorney Clark W. Sessions. The Court heard the 
testimony the witnesses presented, received the exhibits, and took 
the matter under advisement. After further review, the Court 
hereby renders this its: 
0001~6 
JENSEN V. JENSEN PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The parties were married July 30, 1970. They were each raised 
in Carbon County, Utah. The plaintiff attended two years college 
at the College of Eastern Utah, and one year at the University of 
Utah, and through the course of the marriage did limited work _ 
outside the home. For some period of time she did work as a 
secretary/receptionist and bookkeeper in the law offices of her 
husband and father-in-law. She is able-bodied and capable of 
working outside the home, but her income would be nominal. 
The defendant was admitted to practice law in 1969, and 
practiced in Carbon County with his father, Therald N. Jensen. The 
defendant was previously married and had one child. The parties 
together had three children, all but the youngest of whom are 
emancipated by age, and the youngest is currently a senior in high 
school and will shortly be emancipated. 
The defendant 1 s father was a prominent attorney in Price, 
Utah. His financial interests included banking, ranching, and the 
practice of law. For clarity, throughout this opinion when I refer 
to Therald N. Jensen, I will refer to him as 11 TN11 ; James Jensen as 
11James 11 ; Jerry Jensen as 11Jerry11 ; Dix Jensen as 11 Butch11 ; and Bonnie 
Lynne as 11 Bonnie11 • Therald Jensen's wife was named Bonnie and, if 
appropriate, she will be distinguished from 11 Bonnie Lynne 11 in the 
contextual reference by 11Mrs. Jensen. 11 
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As in almost every divorce, the contested issues, excluding 
custody, are fundamentally two: first, what is an equitable and 
legally appropriate division of property; and second, what amount 
should be paid in alimony from the defendant to the plaintiff. 
The assets of the marriage are significant. The plaintiff's 
position is that all of the assets now owned should simply be 
divided in half. The defendant's position is that virtually all of 
the significant assets of the marriage are separate property having 
originated from his parents and should be construed as "separate 
property". If separate property, the defendant argues that he is 
entitled to retain the property, as well as the appreciated value 
thereof. The plaintiff has maintained that though much of the 
property came originally from gifts and inherited origins, she has 
either augmented, maintained or protected the inherited property, 
or that it was sufficiently commingled so that it lost its separate 
character thus allowing her to share equally in the estate. The 
Court has sincerely struggled with the challenges of the parties' 
various positions. 
In determining the status of the property, the Court must 
first determine whether the property is separate property subject 
to retention with the appreciated value; separate property that has 
lost its separate identity through being commingled; separate 
property which has lost its separate identity through being 
augmented, maintained or protected, sufficient to lose its separate 
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identity; and/ or marital property. In order to determine this, the 
Court must look at each item of property and find the status of 
that property. Thus, the Court finds as follows: 
SEPARATE, COMMINGLED MARITAL PROPERTY 
In regard to each of the various items of property, the Court 
finds and categorizes the property, as follows. 
The Court recognizes that a majority of the assets currently 
held by the parties have been acquired principally through the T. N. 
Jensen family. Much of the property involved i:n the present 
ranching interests was significantly obtained and h.ad its origins 
in the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's, prior to the marriage of the 
parties. During the period after initial acquisition and prior to 
his death in 1992, T.N. acquired considerable ranching assets and 
inventory. There is no dispute in the testimony that it was his 
primary dream to provide ranching opportunities for his children 
and their children, consistent with their individual desires. That 
dream has been accomplished well. 
1. T.N. company: The Court finds that T.N. Company is a 
Utah partnership formed in approximately 1982 or 1983 by "TN", 
"James", "Jerry", and "Butch". T.N. Company is the successor 
company to T.N., Inc. In the beginning, TN ownE!d 84% of the 
company, and at the time of his death he retained 48.6%. While the 
percentages of the three Jensen brothers, according to the official 
records are not equal, it was clearly testified to 1:hat they each 
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deem their interest to be equal and that James does not claim any 
interest other than one-third, even if the records show otherwise. 
T.N. Company is the operating company of the livestock operation, 
and has encountered significant losses during recent years. In 
1996, the losses were $340,000. The Company owns in excess of 
1,100 cows, 60 bulls, and 30 horses, with miscellaneous tack, 
vehicles and equipment, etc., consistent therewith. At the present 
time, the Company owns a shop building that will be discussed 
separately. It is the Court's belief that T.N. Company is comprised 
of "inherited property" and should remain the property of James, 
including any appreciated value thereon. Thus, the Court finds the 
one-third interest in T.N. Company held by James should remain his 
separate property. 
2. T.N. Ranches: T.N. Ranches is the entity which is the 
principal owner of the following property: 
(a) The Range Creek Ranch: The Range Creek Ranch, consisting 
of a coalition of multiple homesteads, was acquired by T.N. and 
Mrs. Jensen during the 1950's. These properties were contributed 
in whole from T.N., and Mrs. Jensen to T.N., Inc. which then 
transferred the same to T.N. Ranches. 
3. Jensen Brothers Properties: The Court notes that much of 
the property is owned in the name of "Jensen Brothers" or James, 
Jerry and Butch. These properties include a substantial interest 
in deeded real property, state and federal grazing permits, and 
f\ : , {I ~ !'I i\ · 
JENSEN V. JENSEN PAGE 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
U.S. Forest Service permits. Jensen Brothers is owned one-third by 
each of the brothers, and includes the following: 
(a) The Moynier Ranch. As to the ob1:aining of the 
Moynier Ranch, the Court notes that it was purchased through an 
agreement, dated September 1, 1976, by Butch, .and thereafter 
assigned to the three Jensen brothers. The evidenc:e was that the 
ranch was effectively obtained by Butch, but assignE~d to the three 
Jensen brothers and paid for through their ranching operations, or 
T. N. Company. There is no evidence of cash calls from marital 
estate property from any of the brothers, except for one sum of 
approximately $25,000, which apparently was received in cash at the 
time of the passing of T.N., the second parent of James to die. 
Apparently, each child received approximately $25, 000, at that 
time, and the Court does not recall whether that $25,000 is 
separate from the testimony in which it was stated James put 
approximately $25, 000 into the purchase p:r·ice of the lt-toynier Ranch, 
arguably from marital property. The Court believes that it remains 
fair and equitable to allow James to retain the whole of the Jensen 
Brothers property assets and interests as separate property, and 
believes that an equitable offset of the $25,000 whic:::h, if it came 
from marital funds, would be subject to sharing, has been equitably 
dealt with hereafter in relation to the other assets <Jf the marital 
estate: 
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(b) The Black Dragon (Spotted Wolf) Grazing Permit: The land 
subject to this grazing permit was obtained by Butch, and a 
brother-in-law James D. Wilcox. It was originally granted through 
an option to purchase. The interest of Mr. Wilcox was assigned to 
Butch and on behalf of Butch, the prior owners were notified in 
September of 1980 of the election to exercise the option. This 
property is held in the names of James, Jerry and Butch. The 
purchase price of $55, 000 was paid in annual installments of 
$11,000 each, with applicable interest, and the funds for the 
purchase being provided by TN. Thus, the property and successor 
interests remain the separate property of James and his brothers. 
(c) The coal creek Farm and Orfanakis Winter Grazing 
Property: This property was acquired prior to 1970 by Mr. and Mrs. 
T.N. Jensen, and consists of approximately 360 acres in Wellington, 
Utah. The property was conveyed from T.N. and Mrs. Jensen to T.N. 
Ranches in 1983, and from T.N. Ranches to the three Jensen brothers 
in 1989. Thus, the property originated from T.N. and Mrs. Jensen 
and remains separate property of James and his brothers. 
The Orfanakis Winter Grazing had a similar origin through T.N. 
and Mrs. Jensen, and was conveyed from them through T.N. Ranches to 
the three Jensen brothers in 1989, and remains the separate 
property of James and his brothers. 
(d) The Cisco Winter Grazing Permit: This property was 
obtained by T.N. for a purchase price of approximately $100,000 in 
{I n !i ~; o 9. 
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February of 1987, paid entirely by T.N. and placed ultimately in 
the name of the three Jensen brothers. Thus, it was acquired by TN 
and remains the sole and separate property of James and his 
brothers. 
(e) The Siaperis Lands: In 1977, T.N. and James entered into 
an agreement with Nick and Ileen Siaperis to purchase a 60 acre 
field for $70,000. A month later, the Siaperis assigrned an Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase they held with Alex and Shirley 
Tidwell to T.N. and James, to purchase their property for $60,000. 
The combined purchase prices amounted to $130,000. James and his 
mother borrowed $130,000 from Walker Bank to pay each price, and 
mortgaged the law office building then held exclusive!ly in the name 
of Mrs. Jensen. After the purchase price was paid, the land was 
titled in the names of James and his mother, Mrs. Jensen, and later 
was traded for property adjoining the Coal Creek farm, taken in the 
name of James and his mother, as joint tenants, with the right of 
survivorship. Upon the death of Mrs. Jensen, her interest was 
conveyed to Jerry and Butch, as tenants in common. While there 
appears to be a present imbalance in the ownership from the one-
third interests testified to by James, it does appear that all of 
the funds giving rise to purchase of the property came from Mrs. 
Jensen through her interest in the office building, and thus, the 
present status of the property should remain the separate property 
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of James and his brothers. The Court will deal with the law office 
building hereafter. 
(f) Other Winter BLM Grazing Permits: The ranching company 
has BLM authorization in Rock Creek, 
Icelander grazing permit allotments. 
Fan Canyon, Columbia, and 
These were all obtained by 
T.N. andjor T.N. and his sons prior to 1970, and in February of 
1983 were transferred to the three Jensen brothers. This property 
would remain separate property of James and his brothers. There 
was also a Price River grazing allotment acquired in 1985, 
similarly, by the three Jensen brothers, for nominal consideration, 
and to avoid confusion should remain as the separate property of 
James and his brothers. 
(g) water Rights and Mineral Rights: Water rights and mineral 
rights used or associated with any of the ranching andjor farming 
operations remain the separate property of James and where 
appropriate the other Jensen children. It is the intention of the 
Court's award that water rights and mineral rights remain with the 
respective properties as awarded hereby. 
The Court further notes that none of the aforementioned T.N. 
Ranches or Jensen Brothers Properties have ever been titled in the 
names of spouses of any of T.N.'s children, nor have any of the 
spouses ever been asked to pledge independent credit or support for 
the ranching operations. The Court believes it is just, fair and 
equitable to consider these properties separate properties from the 
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marital estate, and thus the properties, with their appreciated 
value, remain the interest of James. 
The Court further notes that the testimony submitted at trial 
indicated that Linda Jensen went very infrequently to the 
properties, and there was no evidence that she augmented, 
maintained or protected the properties. There was evidence that 
James took weekend time away from the family to work on the 
properties, and the Court believes that in the property 
subsequently referred to as "commingled", Linda Jen:sen receives an 
equitable allocation to enhance her share of the marital estate. 
The Court in making a finding regarding the ranching 
properties, also notes particularly that James throughout the 
marriage, maintained an active practice of law, and thus, through 
that practice, generated income to support the family. The 
ranching operations, while representing significant present value, 
have not been a major source of funding for <:mgoing family 
activities and operations. James' allocation of time to the 
ranching properties has been primarily spare time, away from the 
practice of law, but certainly, likewise, away from the family, and 
thus at the expense of family sacrifice. 
4. The Monica cove Home: The Monica Cove hc:>me is now the 
residence of the plaintiff and two of the parties' children, one of 
whom is emancipated by age and employed, the other of whom is a 
senior in high school. The history of the funds from which the 
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Monica Cove home has been obtained come from an investment of James 
prior to the marriage in approximately April of 1968, at which time 
he joined with two others in forming the "Mitchell Funeral Home, 
Inc. , a Utah corporation." Thereafter, in May of 1990, Walmart 
stores purchased the property of the funeral operation for 
development of a store. To accomplish the transaction, Walmart 
purchased a lot on Chula Vista Circle in Salt Lake City, which was 
traded for the price of the property, generating a tax-free 
exchange. 
$310,000. 
The purchase included a home, and the purchase price was 
That home was later sold for approximately $391,000. 
In addition, a separate payment of $100,000 was made to James 
by the succeeding owners of the funeral home in order to purchase 
his entire interest in the ongoing business operation. Those two 
numbers combined equal $491,000, and that amount was put into the 
purchase of the lot and home at Monica Cove. The Court heard 
testimony, in addition, that the parties had built a home on 
property owned by Linda Jensen's father in Carbon County. It is to 
the marital homes that the petitioner, Linda Jensen, has devoted 27 
years of marriage, and to that asset it is the Court's opinion that 
she has augmented, maintained and protected the asset of the home 
in such a way so as to provide value to the asset and the family's 
living circumstances. The Court notes further that no effort was 
made to loan the $491,000 contribution to the marriage, and James, 
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the Court believes, did not intend to retain that as separate 
property. 
Thus, the Court believes that all assets associated with 
obtaining the Monica Cove home, whether they came from the Carbon 
County home, the contributions personally of the parties to the 
marriage or the value from the Mitchell funeral home, have been 
sufficiently commingled so as to negate the defendant's claim to 
that being separate property. 
5. The Zions Bank Stock: In August of 1973, three years 
after the parties were married, Zions Bank purchased Carbon/Emery 
Bank in a stock exchange. At that time, James received 2, 616 
shares of Zions Bank stock listed in his sole and separate name, 
representing his interest prior to the marriage in the Carbon/Emery 
Bank. In his testimony during the trial, he stated clearly that he 
did not at any time believe that the Zions Bank stock was anything 
other than separate property, predating the marriage. Through 
subsequent stock splits and an additional unknown augmentation of 
748 shares, the stock, over time, increased James• portion to 8,042 
shares of stock. In June of 1985, James placed all of the stock in 
joint tenancy, with the right of survivorship, with the petitioner. 
This change was made, according to the testimony of the parties, at 
a time in which James was engaged in significant business travel, 
and the change was made to avoid probate in the event of his 
untimely death. There is no evidence of any donative intent in 
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that exchange. Those beginning shares, with stock splits and 
automatic divided reinvestment purchases, have expanded that 
portion of the stock to 58,352 shares. That leaves 30,141 shares 
of stock that the Court believes constitute marital property, and 
should be divided equally to each. 
6. The Jensen Law office Building: In early 1974, T.N. and 
Mrs. Jensen agreed to gift to James and Jerry approximately 4.2 
acres of land northwest of Price. The brothers constructed a 50' 
x 60' shop building, at an approximate cost of $25,000. At about 
that same time, Jerry conveyed an interest in American Transport, 
Inc. to James, who changed the name to Malpaso Corporation. The 
Court notes parenthetically that Malpaso Corporation is effectively 
defunct, only owning two trucks with a combined value of 
approximately $7,000. The Court finds it is equitable that Malpaso 
Corporation be awarded as the sole and separate property of James. 
The shop so constructed was used by T.N., Inc., T.N. Company 
and Malpaso, when viable, and those companies provided the funds 
from which repayment of the bank loan was made. 
In January, 1980, James and Linda, the joint tenants in 
ownership of the shop, conveyed the shop to T.N. who, in return, 
conveyed the office building to James and Linda. The office 
building is the same through which both James and T.N. practiced 
law. No monetary consideration was exchanged, and the off ice 
building was of significantly greater value than the shop. The shop 
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was thereafter conveyed to T.N. Company, and remains an asset of 
T.N. Company at this time. 
The office building was sold to the Sampinos family for a net, 
after costs and commission, of $172,731.67. This sum is presently 
held in Summit Exchange Services, Inc. The Court finds that the 
value from the office building, the use of the office building 
during the term of the marriage, and the apparent variations in 
value of the exchange of the office building for the shop, 
justified the Court in finding that the office building asset was 
intended by James and T.N. to be a marital asset, and sufficiently 
commingled so as to have lost its separate identity. As a marital 
asset, it is subject to equal division. 
7. Oil, Gas and Mineral Royalties: The Court finds that the 
parties separately and during the course of their marriage have 
acquired certain oil, gas and mineral royalties and that since the 
trial, certain amounts have been received by James. With respect 
to such oil, gas and mineral interests, the Court finds that they 
should be awarded to the party in whose name they are titled and 
that such interests which are titled jointly should be equally 
divided between them. The Court finds in addition, that James 
should pay to Linda from royalties he has received since the trial 
$1,314.95 less estimated tax which James shall pay of $526.00 or a 
net sum of $788.95. 
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8. Division of other Miscellaneous Assets: The Court finds 
that the furniture, fixtures and personal property at the Monica 
Cove home in the approximate value of $75,000 should be awarded to 
the plaintiff. All clothing, jewelry and personal effects of each 
party is awarded to each, without consideration of value. 
The vehicles are awarded as follows: the 1990 BMW to Linda 
Jensen with an equity of $18,675; the 1993 Chevrolet truck is an 
asset of T.N. Company, and otherwise considered there; the 1995 
Chevrolet Tahoe, with an equitable value of $22,575 is an asset of 
James; the 1984 Coachman Motor Home, with an equitable value of 
$12,436, is an asset of James; the 1995 Jeep Cherokee, with an 
equitable value of $23,925 is an asset of Linda. 
The certificates of deposit at Zions Bank in the amount of 
$28,982.49, plus subsequent increases, should be divided in half. 
Since the trial, Zions Bank has paid and James has received 
dividends totaling .50 per share on the 30,141 shares determined to 
be marital property. James shall pay to Linda as her share of such 
dividends the sum of $7, 53 5. 2 5 less income taxes attributable 
thereto which James shall pay in the estimated amount of $3,014.00 
or a net sum payable to Linda from James of $4,521.25. 
The 40 acre parcel of raw ground which abuts the Coal Creek 
Farm should be awarded to Linda at a value of $45,000, subject to 
existing roadways, ditches and easements. 
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The 1996 federal tax refunds of $21,543 shall be divided in 
half. 
The John Hancock Life Insurance policy, with a cash value of 
$55,546 should be awarded to Linda Jensen. 
The IRA of each party should be awarded to each, in the amount 
of $16,542.63 each. 
The value of the Savage Pension Fund of $206,774.27 should be 
divided equally to each according to the Woodward formula. 
The mantlepiece from the Spring Glen home in the value of 
$10,000 should be awarded to James. 
The equity from the sale of the Spring Glen home of 
$169,374.72 has been divided equally between the pa.rties. 
The TN Jensen Home Place and Big Field shall remain the 
separate property of the Jensen children, Jim, Jerry, Bonnie and 
Butch, without claim from Linda. 
Charges incurred for the chip seal of the roadway on Linda's 
father's land which provides access to the Spring Glen home and 
Linda's father's home and adjoining property of her father in the 
approximate amount of $11,000 is determined to be a marital 
obligation and should be shared and paid equally by the parties. 
The Court further finds that it is fair and equitable to each 
to be responsible for any and all acquired obligations after the 
separation of the parties. 
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In addition, it is equitable for James to hold the petitioner 
harmless on the first mortgage to Far West Bank, and the line of 
credit to Zions Bank in the combined amount of $203,000, thus, 
allowing the plaintiff to continue residing in the home without a 
mortgage obligation, and thereby allowing her to elect to remain 
there, so long as she wishes. 
The Court having previously categorized the property, now to 
illustrate the division creates the following schedule: 
Description 




Monica Cove Furniture 
Value 
Zions Bank Stock 













$ 781,782.19 M 
Price Law Office Building 
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Deposit - Zions 
1996 tax refund 
John Hancock 
Life Policy 
IRA of each party 
Savage Pension 
Mantlepiece 
Spring Glen Home 
equity previously 
























Based upon the Court's general equitable power, the Court finds 
that certain of these assets should not be divided equally to the 
parties, even though they were acquired during the course of the 
marriage and have been determined by the Court to constitute in part 
the marital estate. The court finds that an appropriate equitable 
distribution of the foregoing assets is as follows: 
DESCRIPTION 
Monica Cove Property 
Furniture 
Mortgages on Monica Cove 
Zions Bank Stock 
(30141 shares @ $51.875) 
1990 BMW 750 
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1984 Coachman Motor Home 
1995 Jeep Cherokee 
Zions Bank Certificate 
of Deposit 
PAGE 19 
Estimated taxes on Interest 
1996 Tax Refund 
John Hancock Life Insurance 
Cash Value 
IRA of each party 
Savage Pension 
Mantle Piece 
SpringGlen Home Equity 
4 o acre parcel 
Net Proceeds from sale of 
Price Office Building 
Estimated taxes on sales 
proceeds 
Estimated interest earned on 
Price Office Building Sale 
Proceeds @ 3% since sale in 
May 1997 
Estimated taxes on interest 
























Next, the Court must turn to the issue of alimony. The Court 
finds certainly, that with a 27-year marriage, that permanent 
alimony is appropriate. However, the Court finds that having made 
an equitable distribution of the assets unequally and granting to 
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the plaintiff the greater portion of the marital assets, and 
recognizing in so doing that the defendant had the benefit of 
premarital assets that are now of significant appreciated value, the 
Court determines that assets valued at $1,134,811.16 (noted by"*") 
could be considered by the plaintiff as working assets, capable of 
generating a rate of return. Assuming that rat•e of return to 
average 7. 5% per year, that amount should yield an income of 
$85,110.84, or $7,092.57 per month. In addition, that Court would 
note that while it is not my desire, nor the expec1:ed need of the 
plaintiff to sell her home and move to a home of cc::>mparable value 
to that occupied by the defendant, the plaintiff could generate an 
additional $200,000 differential amount, which could earn an 
additional $15,000 per year, or $1,250 per month. 
Thus, the Court could find that the income potentially 
generated from the assets awarded to the plaintiff would be 
sufficient to meet her needs. However, this ignores the 27 year 
term of the marriage, and strikes the Court as fundamentally 
inequitable when the defendant would not be required to live off of 
the yield from his assets, but has separate earned inc:::ome. Assuming 
defendant's annual gross income to be approximately $195,000, that 
gives him a monthly gross income of $16,250 per month .. Defendant has 
been paying approximately $6,000 per month in temporary alimony 
during the parties' separation, but the plaintiff has: been required 
to pay the mortgage on the Monica Cove home in the approximate 
amount of $2,200, so requiring the defendant to hold the plaintiff 
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harmless on that mortgage, the court finds that it is reasonable to 
require the defendant to pay alimony in the amount of $4,000 per 
month from November 1, 1997, until the defendant reaches age 65. The 
court notes the defendant is now just over 55, having a birthday in 
February. After age 65, each party should be required to bear their 
future expenses based upon their earnings generated from assets The 
court finds that the present value of the alimony award here, based 
on the assumption of a 10 year term, assuming earning capacity on 
the fund of 7.5%, is $336,987.97. Should the defendant elect from 
his awarded property, he may pay at any time the present value of 
the remaining alimony payable at a discount rate of 7. 5% and 
terminate the alimony obligations. Otherwise, the Court orders the 
alimony to continue uninterrupted, unless the defendant should die 
or reach age 65. No other event should terminate the alimony. 
Defendant shall be given credit against his alimony obligation of 
$2,500 which he paid subsequent to the trial. 
The Court having divided the assets as heretofore stated, finds 
that the present value of the plaintiff's individual net worth, 
after marital division is $2,004,736.16, and the present value of 
the defendant's individual net worth, after division of marital 
assets is $1,001,800.48, not including the significant assets of the 
ranching operations, properties and bank stock which have been 
declared separate property. 
Each of the parties should be required to execute and deliver 
to the other such deeds, assignments, conveyances and bills of sale 
flfl(jf)·f ~-
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as each may request from time to time with respec·t to the assets 
awarded to the respective parties, including those assets which the 
Court has found and determined to be separate properties from the 
marital estate. ~ ,, 
Dated this day of 
A 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA H. JENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES T. JENSEN, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 964900752 
Judge David s. Young 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for trial before 
the undersigned, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court 
commencing on October 28, 1997 and concluding with closing 
arguments on November 12, 1997. Thereafter, the Respondent moved 
the Court to bifurcate the proceedings and to immediately grant a 
Decree of Divorce to the Petitioner which the Court did by Decree 
of Divorce entered in the above-captioned action on June 22, 1998. 
The Court thereafter considered the evidence and testimony adduced, 
the arguments and statements of counsel, the files and records 
herein and the law appertaining thereto and having issued its 
Memorandum Decision on November 12, 1998, and being fully advised 
in the premises, now make and enters the following: 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties were married each to the 
other on July 30, 1970, a marriage of some 28 years. 
2. The Court finds that the parties were each raised in 
Carbon County, State of Utah and that the Plaint:iff, following 
graduation from high school, attended two years of College of 
Eastern Utah and one year at the University of Utah. 
3. The Court finds that during the course <')f the parties' 
marriage, the Plaintiff engaged in limited work outside of the 
parties' home, including some work as a secretary/receptionist and 
bookkeeper in the law offices of her husband and her father-in-law, 
Therald N. Jensen, ("TN Jensen") who was a promimmt attorney in 
Price, Utah, until his death. Additionally, the Court finds that 
TN Jensen's financial interests included banking and ranching as 
well as the practice of law. 
4. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is able-bodied and 
capable of working outside of the home, but that her income from 
employment would be nominal. 
5. The Court finds that the Defendant was admitted to 
practice law in the State of Utah in 1969 and practiced primarily 
in carbon County, State of Utah, with his father until a fairly 
recent move to Salt Lake City, Utah, where he accepted employment 
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with and is currently employed by Savage Industries as Executive 
Vice President and General Counsel with annual earnings of 
approximately $195,000, which includes bonuses from time to time. 
Further, the Court finds that the Defendant is a member of the 
board of directors of Zions First National Bank from which he 
receives director's fees and that he has other dividend and 
interest earnings from investments and other business operations as 
hereinafter more fully set forth. 
6. The Court finds that the Defendant was previously married 
and had one child born as the issue of that marriage. Further, the 
Court finds that the parties had three children born as the issue 
of their marriage, two of whom are emancipated by age and the 
youngest of whom is currently a senior in high school and will 
shortly be emancipated. 
7. The Court finds that the Defendant has substantial 
separate property which originated from his parents as well as from 
gifts and inheritances which the Court further finds were not 
commingled with marital property and that the Plaintiff did not 
augment, maintain or protect the same sufficient to lose the 
identify of such properties as separate properties. With respect 
to such separate property, the Court finds that such was acquired 
principally through the TN Jensen family and that much of the 
property involved in the Defendant's current ranching interest was 
significantly obtained and had it origins in the 1940's, 1950's and 
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1960's, prior to the marriage of the parties. Additionally, the 
Court find that during the period after the initial acquisition of 
such properties and prior to his death in 1992, TN ~rensen acquired 
considerable ranching interests and inventory. ~rhe Court also 
finds that the testimony is undisputed that it was the primary 
dream of TN Jensen to provide ranching opportunities for his 
children and their children consistent with their individual 
desires and that such dream was well accomplished. 
8. The court finds that T.N. Company is a Utah partnership 
formed in approximately 1982 or 1983 by TN Jensen and his children, 
James, Jerry and Butch. The Court also finds that ~·.N. Company is 
the successor company to T.N., Inc. In the beginning, TN Jensen 
owned 84% of the company and at the time of his death, he retained 
48.6% of the company. While the percentage ownership interests of 
the three Jensen brothers according to the official records are not 
equal, it was clear from the testimony that they each deemed their 
interest to be equal and that the Defendant claims only a one-third 
interest regardless of what the official records may show or 
reflect. 
9. The Court finds that T.N. Company is the operating 
company of the livestock operations and has encountered significant 
losses during recent years. In 1996, such losses were $340,000. 
TN Company owns in excess of 1,100 cows, 60 bulls and 30 horses 
4 
with miscellaneous tack, vehicles and equipment consistent 
therewith. 
10. The Court finds that T.N. Company is comprised of 
inherited property and should remain the sole and separate property 
of the Defendant including any appreciated value thereon. 
11. The court finds that T.N. Ranches is the entity which is 
the principal owner of the Range Creek Ranch which consists of a 
coalition of multiple homesteads and was acquired by T.N. Jensen 
and his wife during the 1950s. such properties were contributed in 
whole from TN Jensen and Mrs. Jensen to T.N., Inc. which then 
transferred the same to T.N. Ranches. 
12. The Court finds that much of the property is titled in 
the name of "Jensen Brothers" or their individual names. Such 
properties include a substantial interest in deeded real property, 
state and federal grazing permits and u.s. Forest Service permits. 
The Court finds that Jensen Brothers is owned one-third by each of 
the brothers and includes the following: 
a. The Moynier Ranch. The Court finds that the Moynier 
Ranch was purchased through an agreement dated September 1, 1976 by 
Butch Jensen and thereafter assigned to the three Jensen brothers. 
The evidence adduced at trial was that the Moynier Ranch was 
effectively obtained by Butch Jensen but assigned to the three 
Jensen brothers and paid for through the ranching operations or 
T.N. Company. The Court finds that there was no evidence of cash 
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calls from marital estate property from any of the brothers, except 
for one sum of approximately $25,000 which apparently was received 
in cash at the time of the passing of TN Jensen, the second parent 
of the Defendant to die. Each child received approximately $25,000 
at that time and while it is unclear as to whether the $25,000 is 
separate from the testimony in which it was test:ified that the 
Defendant put approximately $25,000 into the purchase price of the 
Moynier Ranch, arguably from marital property, the Court finds that 
it remains fair, just and equitable to allow the Defendant to 
retain the whole of the Jensen Brothers property assets and 
interests as his sole and separate property and further finds that 
as an equitable offset of the $25,000 which, if it came from 
marital funds would be subject to sharing, has been ~equitably dealt 
with in relation to other assets of the marital estate hereinafter 
described. 
b. The Black Dragon {Spotted Wolf) Grazing Permit: The 
Court finds said permit was obtained by Butch Jensen and a brother-
in-law, James D. Wilcox through an option to purchase. Thereafter 
the interests of Mr. Wilcox was assigned to Butch Jensen and on 
behalf of Butch the prior owners were notified in September of 1980 
of the election to exercise such option. This asset is held in the 
names of each of the Jensen brothers individually. The purchase 
price of $55,000, the Court finds was paid in annual installments 
of $11,000 each, with applicable interest and the funds for the 
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purchase were provided by TN Jensen. As such, the property and 
successor interests remain the separate property of the Defendant 
and his brothers. 
c. The Coal Creek Farm and Orfanakis Winter Grazing 
Property was acquired prior to 1970 by TN Jensen and his wife and 
consists of approximately 360 acres in Wellington, Utah. That 
property was conveyed from TN Jensen and his wife to T.N. Ranches 
in 1983 and from T.N. Ranches to the three Jensen brothers in 1989. 
Thus, the property originated from TN Jensen and his wife and 
remains the separate property of the Defendant and his brothers. 
The Court also finds that the Orfanakis Winter Grazing Property had 
an origin similar to the Coal Creek Farm through TN Jensen and his 
wife and was conveyed from them through T.N. Ranches to the three 
Jensen brothers in 1989 and remains the sole and separate property 
of the Defendant and his brothers. 
d. The Cisco Winter Grazing Permit was obtained by TN 
Jensen for a purchase price of approximately $100,000 in February 
of 1987, which purchase price was paid entirely by TN Jensen and 
placed ultimately in the name of the three Jensen brothers. As 
such, it was acquired by TN Jensen and remains the sole and 
separate property of the Defendant and his brothers. 
e. The Siaperis Lands were acquired pursuant to an 
agreement with Nick and Ileen Siaperis in 1977 whereunder a 60 acre 
field was acquired for $70, ooo. Approximately one month later, the 
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Siaperis' assigned an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
they held with Alex and Shirley Tidwell to TN Jensen and the 
Defendant to purchase their property for $60,000. The combined 
purchase price amounted to $130,000. The Defendant: and his mother 
borrowed $130, ooo from Walker Bank to pay the combined purchase 
price and mortgaged the law office building, then held exclusively 
in the name of Mrs. Jensen as security for such lc::>an. After the 
purchase price was paid, the land was titled in the names of the 
Defendant and his mother and later was traded for property 
adjoining the Coal Creek Farm which was titled in ·the name of the 
Defendant and his mother as joint tenants with rights of 
survivorship. Upon the death of Mrs. Jensen, her interest was 
conveyed to Jerry Jensen and Butch Jensen as tenants in common. 
While there appears to be an imbalance presently in the ownership 
from the one-third interest testified to by the Def,endant, it does 
appear that all of the funds giving rise to the purchase of the 
property came from Mrs. Jensen through her interests in the office 
building and thus the property should remain the separate property 
of the Defendant and his brothers. 
f. The Court finds that the ranching company has BLM 
authorization in Rock Creek, Fan Canyon, Columbia, and Icelander 
grazing permit allotments. These grazing permit allotments were 
all obtained by TN Jensen andfor TN Jensen and the three Jensen 
brothers prior to 1970 and in February of 1983 were transferred to 
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the three Jensen brothers. These assets, together with a Price 
River grazing allotment acquired in 1985, similarly, by the three 
Jensen brothers, for nominal consideration, and to avoid confusion 
should remain the separate property of the Defendant and his 
brothers. 
g. The Court finds that various water rights and 
mineral rights used or associated with any of the ranching andjor 
farming operations are the separate property of the Defendant and 
where appropriate, the other Jensen children. As such, the water 
rights and mineral rights remain with the respective properties as 
awarded by the Court. 
13. The Court finds that none of the aforementioned T. N. 
Ranches or Jensen Brothers Properties have ever been titled in the 
names of spouses of any of TN Jensen's children nor have any of the 
spouses ever been requested to pledge independent credit or support 
for the ranching operations. As such, the Court finds that it is 
fair, just and equitable that such properties be found to be 
separate properties from the marital estate, including any 
appreciated value therein. 
14. The Court finds that the testimony at trial was that the 
Plaintiff went very infrequently to the properties and there was no 
evidence that she augmented, maintained or protected the 
properties. Further, the Court finds that while there was evidence 
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that the Defendant took weekend time away from the family to work 
on the properties, and that in the property subsequently referred 
to as "commingled" Plaintiff will receive, the Court finds that she 
will receive through the distribution of assets herein, an 
equitable allocation to enhance her share of the marital estate. 
15. The Court finds that the Defendant throughout the-
marriage maintained an active practice of law and thus through that 
practice generated income to support the Plaintiff and their family 
and that while the ranching operations represent a significant 
present value, they have not been a major source of funding for 
ongoing family activities and operations. Additionally, the Court 
finds that the Defendant's allocation of time to the ranching 
properties has been primarily spare time away from the practice of 
law, but certainly likewise, away from the family, and thus at the 
expense of family sacrifices. 
16. That during the marriage of the parties, a residence and 
real property known as the Monica Cove home, which is now the 
residence of the Plaintiff and two of the parties' children, one of 
whom is emancipated by age and employment and the ot:her of whom is 
a senior in high school was acquired. The Court furt:her finds that 
the funds used to acquire the Monica Cove residence and real 
property were obtained from an investment of the DefEmdant prior to 
the marriage of the parties in approximately April of 1968. At 
that time, he joined with two other individuals in forming the 
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Mitchell Funeral Home, Inc., a Utah corporation. Thereafter, in 
May of 1990, Walmart stores purchased the property of the funeral 
operations for development of a store in Price, Utah. To 
accomplish the transaction, Walmart purchased a lot on Chula Vista 
Circle in Sale Lake city, Utah, which was traded for the price of 
the property generating a tax free exchange. The purchase included 
a home and the purchase price was $310,000. The home was later 
sold for approximately $391,000. Further, the Court finds that a 
separate payment of $100, 000 was made to the Defendant by the 
succeeding owners of the funeral home in order to purchase his 
entire interest in the ongoing business operations. Those two 
amounts combined, equal $491,000, which amount was put into the 
purchase of the lot and home at Monica Cove. Additionally, the 
evidence was that the parties had built a home on property owned by 
the Plaintiff's father in Carbon County, Utah and it is to those 
marital homes that the Plaintiff has devoted 28 years of marriage 
and as to the Monica Cove residence and real property that the 
Court finds that the Plaintiff has augmented, maintained and 
protected the same in such a way so as to provide value to the 
asset and the family's living circumstances. The Court finds in 
addition, that no effort was made to loan the $491,000 contribution 
to the marriage and the Defendant did not intend to retain that 
asset as his sole and separate property. As such, the Court finds 
that all assets associated with obtaining the Monica Cove residence 
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and real property, whether they came from the Carbon County home, 
the contribution personally of the parties to the marriage or the 
value from the Mitchell Funeral Home, have been sufficiently 
commingled so as to negate a finding that the MoniccL Cove residence 
and real property is the sole and separate property of the 
Defendant. 
17. The Court finds that in August of 1973, 3 years after the 
parties were married, Zions Bank purchased the Carbon Emery Bank in 
a stock exchange. At that time, the Defendant received 2, 616 
shares of Zions Bank stock listed in his sole ancl separate name 
which represented his interest in the Carbon Emery Bank prior to 
the parties' marriage. The testimony was clear that the Defendant 
did not at any time believe that the Zions Bank stock was anything 
other than separate property pre-dating the marriage. Through 
subsequent stock splits and an additional unknown augmentation of 
748 shares, such stock over time increased the Defendant's portion 
to 8, 042 shares of stock. Those beginning shares with stock splits 
and automatic dividend reinvestment purchases have expanded that 
portion of the stock to 58,352 shares. 
18. The Court finds that in June of 1985, the Defendant 
placed all of the stock in joint tenancy with rights of 
survivorship with the Plaintiff. This change was made according to 
• 
the testimony of the parties at a time when the Defendant was 
engaged in significant business travel, and the change was made to 
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avoid probate in the event of his untimely death. There was no 
evidence adduced at the trial of any donative intent with respect 
to such exchange. 
19. The Court finds that during the course of the parties' 
marriage, additional shares in Zions Bank were acquired in a total 
amount after stock splits and dividend reinvestment purchases to an 
existing total of 30,141 shares of such stock, which the Court 
finds to be marital property and equally divided between the 
parties. Since the trial, Zions Bank has paid and the Defendant 
has received dividends totaling .50 per share on the 30,141 shares 
determined to be marital property. The Court further finds that 
the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff as her share of such 
dividends, the sum of $7,535.25 less income taxes attributable 
thereto which the Defendant shall pay in the approximate amount of 
$3,014, resulting in a net sum payable to the Plaintiff from the 
Defendant of $4,521.25. 
20. The Court finds that in early 1974, TN Jensen and his 
wife agreed to gift to the Defendant and Jerry Jensen, 
approximately 4.2 acres of land northwest of Price, Utah. The two 
Jensen brothers constructed on that property a 50' x 60' shop 
building, at an approximate cost of $25,000. At approximately that 
same time, Jerry Jensen conveyed an interest in American Transport, 
Inc. to the Defendant who changed the name of that corporation to 
Malpaso Corporation which the Court finds is effectively defunct, 
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owning only two trucks with a combined value o:f approximately 
$7,000. The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable that 
Malpaso Corporation be awarded to the Defendant as his sole and 
separate property. 
21. The Court finds that the shop constructed on the land 
hereinabove described was used by T.N., Inc. and T.N. Company and 
Malpaso Corporation when viable and those compani1es provided the 
funds from which the repayment of the bank loan was made. In 
January, 1980, the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the joint tenants 
in ownership of the shop, conveyed the same to TN Jensen who in 
return conveyed the office building to the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant. The office building described herein is the same 
building through which both TN Jensen and the Defendant practiced 
law. No monetary consideration was exchanged and the office 
building was of significantly greater value than the shop. The 
shop was thereafter conveyed to T. N. Company and r<emains an asset 
of T.N. Company at this time. 
22. The Court finds that the office building was sold to the 
Sampinos family for a net after costs and commission, of 
$172,731.67, which sum is presently held in esc::row at Summit 
Exchange Services, Inc. The Court further finds that the value 
from the office building, the use of the office building during the 
term of the marriage and the apparent variations in value of the 
exchange of the office building for the shop, justifies the finding 
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that the office building asset was intended by the Defendant and TN 
Jensen to be a marital asset and was sufficiently commingled so as 
to have lost its separate identity. As a marital asset, the Court 
finds it is subject to equal division between the parties. 
23. The Court finds that the parties separately and during 
the course of their marriage, have acquired certain oil, gas and 
mineral royalties and that since the trial, certain amounts have 
been received by the Defendant therefrom. With respect to such 
oil, gas and mineral interests, the Court finds that they should be 
awarded to the party in whose name they are titled and that such 
interests which are titled jointly should be equally divided 
between the parties. Additionally, the Court finds that the 
Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff from royal ties he has 
received since the trial, a net sum of $788.95 representing gross 
receipts of $1,314.95 less estimated tax which the Court finds the 
Defendant should pay of $526.00. 
24. The Court finds that the furniture, furnishings and 
personal property at the Monica Cove home have an approximate value 
of $75,000 and should be awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and 
separate property, together with all clothing, jewelry and personal 
effects, without consideration as to value. 
25. The Court finds that all clothing, jewelry and personal 
effects of the Defendant should be awarded to him as his sole and 
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separate property without consideration of value, together with a 
mantle piece from the Spring Glen home with a value of $10,000. 
26. The Court finds that the TN Jensen Home Place and Big 
Field shall remain the separate property of the J"ensen children, 
namely the Defendant, Jerry Jensen, Bonnie Jensen and Butch Jensen, 
without claim from the Plaintiff and that she has waived any claim 
thereto in open court. 
27. The Court finds that the 40 acre parcel of raw ground 
which abuts the Coal Creek Farm should be awarded to the Plaintiff 
as her sole and separate property at a value of $45,000, subject to 
existing roadways, ditches and easements. 
28. The Court finds that the parties have acquired various 
vehicles and that the Plaintiff should be awarded the 1990 BMW 
vehicle with an equity of $18,675 and the 1995 Jeep Cherokee 
automobile with an equitable value of $23,925. The Court further 
finds that the 1993 Chevrolet truck is an asset of 'l~.N. Company and 
has otherwise been considered herein and that the Defendant should 
be awarded as his sole and separate property, the 1995 Chevrolet 
Tahoe with an equitable value of $22,575 and the 1985 Coachman 
motor home with an equitable value of $12,436. 
29. The Court finds that certain certificates of deposit at 
Zions Bank in the amount of $28,982.49 plus subsequent increases 
should be equally divided between the parties. 
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30. The Court finds that the parties' 1996 federal tax 
refunds of $21,543 shall be divided equally between the parties. 
31. The Court finds that an existing John Hancock life 
insurance policy with a cash value of $55,546 should be awarded to 
the Plaintiff as her sole and separate property and further finds 
that each of the parties should be awarded their individual 
retirement accounts in the amount of $16,542.63 each. 
32. The Court finds that since the parties' marriage and 
continuing to the date of the trial in this matter, the Defendant 
has vested benefits in the Savage Pension Fund of $206,774.27 which 
should be divided equally to each according to the Woodward formula 
and that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order should be entered 
with respect thereto. 
33. The Court finds that the equity resulting from the sale 
of the Spring Glen home of $169,374.72 has been divided equally 
between the parties, provided however, charges incurred for the 
chip seal of the roadway on the Plaintiff's father's land which 
provided access to the Spring Glen home and Plaintiff's father's 
home and adjoining property of her father, in the amount of 
$11, 000, the court finds is a martial obligation and should be 
shared and paid equally by the parties. 
34. The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable that 
each of the parties be responsible for any and all acquired 
obligations after their separation. 
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35. The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable for 
the Defendant to hold the Plaintiff harmless from the first 
mortgage obligation on the Monica Cove residence and real property 
to Far West Bank and the line of credit to Zions Bank in the 
combined amount of $203, ooo, thereby allowing the Plaintiff to 
continue residing in such home without a mortgage obligation for as 
long as she wishes. 
36. The Court finds pursuant to its general equitable powers 
that certain assets should not be divided equally between the 
parties even though they were acquired during the~ course of the 
marriage and have been determined by the Court tc' constitute in 
part, the martial estate. By awarding the Plaintiff the greater 
portion of the marital assets, a total of $2,004,736.16 as compared 
to the marital assets awarded to the Defendant of $1,001,800.48, 
the Court recognizes that in so doing the Defendant has had the 
benefit of premarital assets that are now of significant value. 
The Court also finds that certain of the excess assets are working 
assets which the Court finds to be $1,134,811.16 which are capable 
of generating a rate of return and income to the Plaintiff for her 
support and maintenance. Assuming that rate of return to average 
7. 5% per annum, which the Court finds is reasonable that amount 
should yield an income of $85,110.84 or $7,092.57 per month to the 
Plaintiff. Additionally, should the Plaintiff desire to sell the 
Monica Cove residence and move to a home of comparable value to 
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that occupied by the Defendant, the Plaintiff could generate an 
additional $200,000 which could earn an additional $15,000 per year 
or $1,250 per month. 
37. The Court could find that the income potentially 
generated from the assets awarded to the Plaintiff would be 
sufficient to meet her needs. The Court finds however, that such 
findings ignore the 27 year term of the parties' marriage and 
equity requires that the Plaintiff should not be required to live 
off of the yield from her assets when the Defendant would not be 
required to do so by reason of his separate earned income. The 
Court finds that the Defendant's annual gross income is 
.- . 
approximately $195,000, which provides a monthly gross income of 
$16,250 per month. The Defendant has been paying approximately 
$6,000 per month in temporary alimony during the parties' 
separation on a voluntary basis but the Plaintiff has been paying 
the mortgage on the Monica Cove residence in the approximate amount 
of $2,200. The Court therefore finds that the Defendant has the 
ability to pay and it is fair, just and equitable that the 
Defendant hold the Plaintiff harmless from that mortgage and that 
he should be required to pay to the Plaintiff alimony in the amount 
of $4,000 per month from November 1, 1997 until he reaches the age 
of 65 years. After age 65 years, each party should be required to 
bear their future expenses based upon their earnings generated from 
their separate assets. The Court finds that the present value of 
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the alimony award based on the assumption of a ten year term and 
assuming a return on the fund of 7.5% is $336,987.97. Should the 
Defendant elect, from his awarded property, he may pay at any time, 
the present value of the remaining alimony payable at a discount 
rate of 7.5% and terminate his alimony obligation. Otherwise, the 
alimony shall continue uninterrupted until the earlier of the death 
of the Defendant or his attainment of age 65. No other event 
should terminate the alimony. The Court finds in addition, that 
the Defendant should be given credit against his alimony obligation 
of the sum of $2,500 which he paid subsequent to the trial. 
38. Based upon the foregoing Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
the Court now concludes as follows: 
SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To the extent the foregoing Supplemental Findings of Fact 
are Supplemental Conclusions of Law, the same are adopted herein in 
all respects. 
2. That each of the parties should be required to execute 
and deliver to the other, such deeds, assignments, conveyances and 
bills of sale as each may request from time to time 'With respect to 
the assets awarded to the respective parties including those assets 
which the Court has found and determined to be separate properties 
from the marital estate. 
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3. That each of the parties should assume, pay, discharge 
and hold the other harmless from any and all acquired obligations 
after the separation of the parties. 
4. That each of the parties should assume, pay, discharge 
and hold the other harmless from their separate costs and attorneys 
fees incurred herein. 
5. That the Court should make and enter its Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce accordingly. 
DATED this ~of January, 1999. 
OLD G. CHR STENSEN 





SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981} 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for Defendant 
FILED DIST 
Third Jud;~~770~0~Rr ISfrtct 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA H. JENSEN, . SUPPLEMENTAL . 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, ~ J :l 3 <g5Cf' . . 
. v. . Civil No. 964900752 
. 
. 
JAMES T. JENSEN, Judge David s. Young 
Defendant. Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for trial before 
the undersigned, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court 
commencing on October 28, 1997 and concluding with closing 
arguments on November 12, 1997. Thereafter, the Respondent moved 
the Court to bifurcate the proceedings and to immediately grant a 
Decree of Divorce to the Petitioner which the Court did by Decree 
of Divorce entered in the above-captioned action on June 22, 1998. 
The Court thereafter considered the evidence and testimony adduced, 
the arguments and statements of counsel, the files and records 
herein and the law appertaining thereto and having issued its 
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Memorandum Decision on November 12, 1998, and being fully advised 
in the premises, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded and the 
Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay to the Plaintiff as 
and for alimony, the sum of $4,000 per month commencing November 1, 
1997 and continuing until the attainment by the Defendant of the 
age of 65 years, or his earlier death. Otherwise, the Court orders 
that the alimony awarded hereby shall continue uninterrupted and 
shall not terminate. 
2. That the Defendant shall be given credit against his 
alimony obligation, in the sum of $2,500 which he paid subsequent 
to the trial of the case. 
3. That the Defendant shall have the right at any time to 
pay the present value of the remaining alimony due ·the Plaintiff at 
a discount rate of 7. 5% per annum and should he do so, all 
remaining alimony obligations from the Defendant to the Plaintiff 
shall be terminated. 
4. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her 
sole and separate property, without claim from thE! Defendant, the 
following: 
a. The Monica Cove residence and real property at a 
value of $771,000; 
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b. Furniture, furnishings and personal property located 
at the Monica Cove residence and real property at a value of 
$75,000; 
c. 15,070.50 shares of Zions Bank stock at an 
approximate value of $781,782.19; 
d. 1990 BMW 750 automobile at a value of $18,365.84; 
e. 1995 Jeep Cherokee automobile at a value of $23,925; 
f. Zions Bank Certificate of Deposit at a value of 
$29,500; 
g. Life insurance cash value - John Hancock Life 
Insurance Company in the approximate amount of $55,546; 
h. Plaintiff • s individual retirement account in the 
approximate sum of $16,542.63; 
i. One-half of Defendant's retirement plan at Savage 
Industries in the sum of $103,387.14, to be divided pursuant 
to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order; 
j. One-half of the proceeds from the sale of a 
residence and real property located in carbon County and known 
as the Spring Glen home in the sum of $84,687.36; 
k. 40 acre parcel of raw ground which abuts the coal 
Creek Farm at a value of $45,000, subject to existing 
roadways, ditches and easements. 




m. Any oil, gas and mineral royalties and interests 
titled solely in the name of the Plaintiff and one-half of any 
such interests titled in the joint names of the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant; 
n. The sum of $1,314.95 representing Plaintiff's share 
of oil and gas royalties received by Defendant since the 
trial, less income taxes attributable thereto in the estimated 
amount of $526.00, for a net sum of $788.95; 
o. The sum of $7,535.25, representing Plaintiff's share 
of dividends received by the Defendant since ·the trial on the 
parties' joint marital Zions Bank stock le:ss income taxes 
attributable thereto in the estimated amount of $3,014.00 for 
a net sum of $4,521.25; 
5. The Defendant shall be awarded as his sole and separate 
property, without claim from the Plaintiff, the following: 
a. TN Company, a Utah partnership which is the 
successor to T. N. , Inc. , which interest equals one-third 
thereof; 
b. T.N. Ranches, which is the principal owner of the 
Range Creek Ranch which consists of a coalition of multiple 
homesteads; 
c. Jensen Brothers Properties, which includes 
substantial interests in deeded real property, state and 
federal grazing permits, and u.s. Forest s~ervice permits, 
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including the Moynier Ranch, and the Black Dragon (Spotted 
Wolf) Grazing Permit; 
d. The Coal creek Farm and Orphanakis Winter Grazing 
Property; 
e. The Cisco Winter Grazing Permit; 
f. The Siaperis lands and BLM authorizations in Rock 
Creek, Fan Canyon, Columbia, Icelander and Price River grazing 
permit allotments, water rights and mineral rights used or 
associated with any of the ranching andjor farming operations; 
h. 58,352 shares of Zions Bank stock as Defendant's 
pre-marital property. 
i. 15,070.50 shares of Zions Bank stock at an 
approximate value of $781,782.19; 
j. The sales proceeds of the Jensen Law Office building 
or $172,731.67, together with interest thereon since May 1997 
in the sum of $6,477, less income taxes attributable thereto 
in the estimated sum of $25,883.00; 
k. 1995 Chevrolet Tahoe at a value of $22,575; 
1. 1984 Coachman motor home at a value of $12,436; 
m. The parties' 1996 income tax refund of $21,543.00; 
n. Defendant's individual retirement account in the 
approximate sum of $16,542.63; 
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o. One-half of Defendant's retirement plan at Savage 
Industries in the sum of $103,387.14, to be divided pursuant 
to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order; 
p. The mantle piece from the Spring Glen home at a 
value of $10,000; 
q. One-half of the proceeds from the sale of a 
residence and real property located in Carbon County and known 
as the Spring Glen home in the sum of $84,687.36; 
r. All of Respondent's clothing, jewelry and personal 
effects; 
s. The TN Jensen Home Place and Big Field. 
6. That the Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to assume, 
pay, discharge and hold the Plaintiff harmless from the parties' 
first mortgage obligation on the Monica cove residence and real 
property in favor of Far West Bank and the line of credit to Zions 
Bank in the combined amount of $203,000, together 1Nith the income 
tax obligations hereinabove set forth; 
7. Charges incurred in the amount of $11,000 for the chip 
seal of the roadway providing access to the Spring Glen home is a 
marital obligation and the same is ordered to be shared and paid 
equally by the parties. That other than as set forth herein, each 
of the parties be and they are hereby ordered to assume, pay, 
discharge and hold the other party harmless from obligations 
incurred since their separation. 
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s. That each of the parties be and they are hereby ordered 
to assume, pay and discharge their own costs and expenses incurred 
in connection herewith, including costs and attorneys fees, without 
contribution from the other. 
9. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the right 
to continue as an insured under the Defendant's health and medical 
insurance policy in effect through his employer, provided however, 
she shall be responsible for any premium charges associated 
therewith. 
10. That each of the parties be and they are hereby ordered 
to execute and deliver to the other such deeds, assignments, 
conveyances and bills of sale as each may request from time to time 
with respect to the assets awarded to the respective parties, 
including those assets which the Court has found and determined to 
be separate properties from the marital estate. 
DATED this ~ day of January, 1999. 
S TO FORM 
day of January, 1999. 
HA OLD G. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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